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Abstract:  
The paper discusses the role of foreign banks and foreign lending in central and east Euro-
pean countries from the financial-stability perspective using Bank for International Sett-
lements data on global banking. The pattern of foreign bank involvement in the region is 
analyzed and the risk of cross-border contagion explored, focusing on three topics: the ma-
turity of cross-border exposures, the concentration of foreign creditors, and the existence 
of common creditors. 
1.  Introduction 
The strong inflow of capital in recent years has increased the integration of 
the Czech economy into international financial markets. Non-residents have a signi-
ficant share in the equities of the financial and non-financial sectors thanks to past 
foreign direct investment. Moreover, they hold a range of other securities as portfolio 
investment, for example government and corporate bonds and shares traded on stock 
exchanges. As a result, prices of assets on the domestic financial markets often change 
in line with global market sentiment. In addition, a number of domestic entities take 
credit abroad, either via issuing international debt securities or taking loans from in-
ternationally active banks. A similar level of financial integration can be seen in other 
new EU member states and EU accession and candidate countries.  
The dominance of foreign players in domestic markets may generate 
concerns about whether the  domestic financial and real sectors are becoming too 
dependent on foreign factors. One of the traditional problems discussed in analyses 
of financial stability for strongly financially integrated markets is the risk of cross- 
-border contagion. A shock which affects one country can generate turbulence on fi-
nancial markets and spill over to other countries through existing links and financial 
exposures. The issue of cross-border contagion has often been mentioned as one of 
the triggers of the Asian financial crisis in the latter half of the 1990s. The Czech 
Republic experienced this phenomenon during the currency crisis in 1997 (Šmíd-
ková, 1998). 
In this short article, we focus on the  role of foreign banks and foreign 
lending in the Czech Republic and other central and eastern European (CEE) coun-
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tries and explore the scope for cross-border contagion via financial exposures. For 
the  analysis, we use the  data on international banking business from the  Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS), a unique data source of cross-border financial lin-
kages.  
This article is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a short review of lite-
rature related to foreign banks, capital flows and cross-border contagion. Section 3 pre-
sents the main features of the database used for the analysis, while Section 4 analyses 
foreign banks’ involvement in the Czech Republic and other CEE countries. Section 5 
discusses three main factors that can increase the risk of cross-border contagion: ma-
turity of cross-border exposures, concentration of foreign creditors and the existence of 
a common creditor. Section 6 concludes the article. 
2.  Short Review of the Literature 
At least since the crises in Asia, Russia and Brazil in the late 1990s, there 
has been increasing interest in research of cross-border contagion and spillovers that 
can spread a financial crisis from one country to another (Claessen, Forbes, 2001). 
There is no unique definition of contagion: in (Eichengreen et al., 1996), contagion is 
defined as a case where knowing that there is a crisis elsewhere increases the pro-
bability of a  crisis at home. Calvo and Reinhart (1996) distinguish between fun-
damentals-based contagion (also called spillover), which arises when the  infected 
country is linked to others via trade or finance, and “pure” or “true” contagion, which 
arises when common shocks and all channels for potential interconnection are either 
not present or have been controlled for. The latter kind of contagion is usually related 
to the herding behavior of international investors. 
There are two basic strands of empirical literature exploring cross-border 
contagion. Some authors look at co-movement of asset prices and test whether a change 
in asset prices in country  A has some effect on asset prices in country  B, using 
a number of econometric techniques (Baig, Goldfajn, 1999); (Bae et al., 2003); (Cor-
setti et al., 2002); (Forbes, Rigobon, 2002). Kumar and Persaud (2002) test for 
“pure” contagion, looking at the changing risk appetite of investors as a trigger for 
contagion. Some literature on contagion also looks at CEE countries (Linne, 1999); 
(Darvas, Szapary, 1999); (Gelos, Sahay, 2001).   
The other strand of literature looks at existing financial and trade links, ex-
ploring the channels through which contagion could take place (Dornbush et al., 
2000); (Kruger, 2000). Peek and Rosengren (1997) investigate how the  financial 
crisis in Japan in the early 1990s had affected lending by Japanese banks in the Uni-
ted States. Traditional debate has been also been conducted on the matter of whether 
trade or financial linkages are the  main transmission channel for contagion (Ka-
minsky, Reinhart, 2000); (van Rijckeghem, Weder, 2001), concluding that financial 
linkages may be more important, mainly due to the  common bank lender effect. 
Some recent literature thus concentrates on the  role of the  banking system and 
international banks in transmitting financial shocks across borders (Sbracia, Zaghini, 
2003), including the case of CEE countries (Weller, Morzuch, 2000). Some literature 
in this strand uses the same data source as this article, namely the BIS statistics on 
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literature uses, for example, the data from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Sur-
vey compiled by the IMF (de Alessi Gracio et al., 2005).  
Besides empirical literature, there have also been studies providing a theore-
tical framework for possible contagion effects. Pericolli and Sbracia (2003) designed 
a two-country model of portfolio allocation and asset pricing that provides a highly 
stylized account of how a crisis originating in one country can spread to the world 
economy. Other theoretical models can be found in (Obstfeld, Rogoff, 1996) and 
(Corsetti, 2000).  
This article also discusses the role of foreign banks and foreign lending in 
CEE countries as a possible transmitter of shocks across borders. More generally, 
the role of foreign banks in CEE countries and emerging countries has been analyzed 
in recent years, including the positive effects and possible financial stability im-
plications (Haas, Lelyveld, 2003); (Haas, Lelyveld, 2002); (Haas, Naaborg, 2005); 
(Weill, 2003); (Clarke et al., 2001a, 2001b); (Clarke et al., 2002). 
3.  Data Description 
The analysis is based on the  consolidated international banking statistics 
collected by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The data cover financial 
claims reported to BIS by the head offices of domestic banks in 27 major banking 
centers, including the  exposures of their foreign affiliates, and are collected on 
a  worldwide consolidated basis with inter-office positions netted out.
1 The  claims 
include deposits with and loans and advances to banks and non-bank entities, hol-
dings of securities and participations. The main purpose of the statistics is to provide 
comprehensive data on banks’ claims on other countries (BIS, 2003). 
The BIS consolidated statistics distinguish between the residency of the im-
mediate borrower and the residency of the ultimate obligor (McGuire, Wooldridge, 
2005). The ultimate obligor refers to a counterparty that is ultimately responsible for 
servicing the obligation in the event of default by the immediate borrower. As a re-
sult, there are two bases on which claims of reporting banks on other countries (so- 
-called foreign claims) are reported: an immediate borrower basis and an ultimate 
risk basis.  
Foreign claims on an immediate borrower basis consist of international 
claims and local claims of foreign affiliates. International claims include BIS re-
porting banks’ cross-border claims in all currencies plus the local claims of their 
foreign affiliates in foreign (non-local) currencies. Local claims include local claims 
of foreign banks’ affiliates in local currency only. As a result, local claims on an im-
mediate borrower basis understate the local activity of foreign banks’ branches and 
subsidiaries.  
Foreign claims on an ultimate risk basis are broken down to cross-border 
claims and local claims. In this case, however, cross-border claims refer only to 
“real” cross-border claims, while local claims include all local activity of foreign 
banks’ affiliates, both in local and foreign currencies. 
1 In addition to consolidated banking statistics, the BIS also collects data on locational banking statistics 
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As the breakdown of foreign claims by country, maturity, etc. differs be-
tween the data on both bases, in this article we use mainly the data on an immediate 
borrower basis, referring to the statistics on ultimate risk basis only in a few cases. 
4.  Analysis of Foreign Banks’ Involvement 
Foreign banks play a key role in providing financing to CEE countries. As 
Chart 1 indicates, the foreign banks’ involvement, as measured by the amount of 
foreign claims per capita held by major international banks on these countries, was 
rather low during the 1990s, but has increased substantially over the past couple of 
years. 
The Czech Republic stands out as one of the main debtors to internationally 
active banks, but the Baltic countries did catch up in this regard in the recent past 
(Estonia has the highest foreign claims per capita). Foreign claims on southeastern 
countries such as Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia increased from relatively low va-
lues later than those on the other CEE countries. 
In principle, there are two basic channels through which internationally 
active banks can provide credit to other countries: directly, i.e. via cross-border (in-
ternational) lending, or indirectly, via entering the domestic market of a host country 
in the form of a subsidiary or a branch and providing credit locally. Table 1 shows 
the breakdown of foreign claims on CEE countries on an immediate borrower basis. 
As mentioned in Section  3, the  BIS data on an  immediate borrower basis allows 
breaking down the foreign claims into international (cross-border) claims and local 
claims by foreign affiliates, with the caveat that local lending in foreign currency is 
classified as an international rather than local claim. Thus, the figure for local claims 
clearly underestimates the  importance of the  local lending channel, while the  sta-
tistics regarding the international claims overestimate the relevance of cross-border 
credit. 
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In contrast to cross-border lending, local currency lending by foreign af-
filiates was very low or non-existent in the CEE countries in the mid-1990s. Both 
components of foreign lending increased markedly between 1996 and 2005, but 
the pattern slightly differs across countries. Of the analyzed countries, the Czech 
TABLE 1  Composition of Foreign Claims on an Immediate Borrower Basis 
(in USD billion) 
Total foreign claims  International claims  Local claims 
  
1996  2005  1996  2005  1996  2005 
Czech Republic  13.6  94.0  9.6  28.6  4.0  65.4 
             
Hungary  12.9  79.6  11.7  53.5  1.2  26.1 
Poland  11.2  123.2  7.6  62.8  3.6  60.5 
Slovakia  2.7  40.0  2.5  13.6  0.3  26.4 
Slovenia  2.0  17.5  2.0  15.0  0.0  2.5 
             
Estonia  0.2  19.1  0.2  15.9  0.0  3.2 
Lithuania  0.2  14.9  0.2  12.5  0.0  2.4 
Latvia  0.1  12.5  0.1  10.9  0.0  1.6 
             
Bulgaria  2.4  12.5  2.4  9.2  0.0  3.3 
Romania  3.1  31.6  3.0  21.8  0.1  9.7 
Croatia  1.5  45.9  1.5  27.8  0.0  18.2 
Source: BIS Consolidated International Banking Statistics, immediate borrower basis 
 
TABLE 2  Foreign Claims on an Immediate Borrower Basis in Relative Terms 
 
Total foreign 
claims in % 
of GDP 
Local claims by 
foreign banks 
in % of total 
foreign claims 
Total foreign 
claims in % 
of total domestic 
credit 
Local claims 
in % of total 
domestic credit   
1996  2005  1996  2005  1996  2005  1996  2005 
Czech 
Republic  22.2   75.8  29.1  69.6  32.8  178.1  9.5  123.9 
                 
Hungary  28.6   72.8  9.3  32.8  42.6  124.0  3.9   40.6 
Poland  7.3   40.8  32.5  49.1  25.1  125.7  8.1   61.7 
Slovakia  13.1   84.2  9.9  66.0  25.0  178.7  2.5  117.9 
Slovenia  9.6   51.0  0.0  14.1  30.1    82.6  0.0   11.7 
                 
Estonia  3.9  138.9  0.0  16.7  19.1  214.6  0.0   35.8 
Lithuania  3.0   58.1  0.0  16.0  25.9  144.3  0.0   23.0 
Latvia  1.7   79.2  0.0  12.9  14.9  114.1  0.0   14.7 
                 
Bulgaria  24.8   46.8  0.6  26.5  62.2  113.4  0.4   30.1 
Romania  8.8   32.5  2.4  30.9  39.3  179.8  0.9   55.5 
Croatia  7.6  119.3  0.0  39.6  17.4  170.1  0.0   67.3 
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Republic has the highest amount of local claims in absolute terms. However, this 
might be due to both the strong presence of local subsidiaries of foreign banks and 
the  fact that most locally provided loans are denominated in domestic currency 
(CNB, 2006). This contrasts with the practice in many other CEE countries where 
local lending in foreign currency is much more common (Backe, Zumer, 2005); 
(ECB, 2006). 
Table 2 shows both types of foreign banks’ involvement in relative terms. 
The relevance of foreign lending, as measured by the ratio of foreign claims to GDP, 
is very high in Estonia and Croatia, followed by Slovakia, Latvia and the Czech 
Republic. The share of local claims in total foreign claims rose substantially between 
1996 and 2005 in all countries. The increase is the combined result of bank acquisi-
tions, usually via privatization, green-field investments of foreign banks and the high 
credit growth that the CEE countries have been experiencing over the past couple of 
years (Backe, Zumer, 2005); (Backe et al., 2006); (ECB, 2006). Obviously, given 
the  definition of local claims in the  BIS data on an  immediate borrower basis, 
the share of local lending in all foreign claims is underestimated given the high share 
of foreign-currency loans in many CEE countries. 
Table  2 also indicates the  relative importance of foreign credit in com-
parison with domestic credit. In 2005, the combined local-currency lending by fo-
reign affiliates and international claims exceeded the  total domestic credit (ratio 
higher than 100 %) in all countries except Slovenia. In some countries, the ratio of 
foreign claims to domestic credit approaches (or even exceeds) 200 %. Finally, local 
claims of foreign banks’ subsidiaries and branches in local currency represent quite 
a large part of domestic credit. Especially two countries, where local loans are usu-
ally denominated in local currency, i.e. the Czech Republic and Slovakia, exhibit a high 
share.
2  
The data on an  ultimate risk basis better capture the  structure of foreign 
claims, as here the local claims include all locally provided finance regardless of 
the currency of denomination. However, these data are available for CEE countries 
only for the period since 2004, so a comparison over a longer period of time cannot 
be made. In addition, the total foreign claims on an ultimate risk basis differ from 
the total foreign claims on an immediate borrower basis, depending on whether 
the risks have been transferred elsewhere via credit-risk transfer instruments or gua-
rantees. Table 3 shows both the structure of foreign claims and their relevance in 
relative terms on an ultimate risk basis. 
Table 3 shows that total foreign claims on an ultimate risk basis are lower 
than on an immediate borrower basis. This would suggest that the risk of default of 
the debtor in the CEE countries is transferred via credit derivatives or guarantees to 
entities outside the CEE countries. For example, if a UK bank provides a loan to 
a subsidiary of a German carmaker in the Czech Republic and the loan in guaranteed 
by the parent company in Germany, then on an immediate risk basis the loan would 
be reported as a claim on a borrower in the Czech Republic, but on an ultimate risk 
basis the loan would be reported as a claim on a borrower in Germany. Given the re-
2 In principle, the ratio of local currency loans to domestic credit should always be lower than 100 %.
The figures for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, exceeding this limit, might be caused by different me-
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latively large share of foreign ownership of the corporate sector in CEE countries, 
the guarantee channel might be one of the main risk-transfer channels in these coun-
tries. 
The table also shows the relevance of local claims, now including both do-
mestic and foreign currency credit. While in the CEE-5 countries
3 (except Slovenia) 
and AC-3 countries local claims of foreign affiliates make up the larger part of total 
foreign loans, in the Baltic countries cross-border claims represent the main part of 
foreign claims. 
The increase in foreign claims in CEE countries has been mainly due to 
the entry of foreign banks into the domestic markets. Table 4 shows that while 
the number of all banks rather declined over the last six years in the CEE countries, 
the  number of foreign-owned banks increased. This reflects the  on-going new 
entries of foreign entities into the domestic banking sector and its subsequent con-
solidation.   
While in the first half of the 1990s foreign banks usually entered the central 
and eastern European banking markets via green-field investment, establishing 
a branch or subsidiary, towards the end of the 1990s and especially over the last five 
years the most usual way of entry was acquisition of a local bank through priva-
tization. Moreover, some of the green-field-based subsidiaries and branches of fo-
reign banks later participated in state bank privatizations. As a result, the share of 
TABLE 3  Foreign Claims on an Ultimate Risk Basis 








































Republic  85.1  26.9  58.2  68.7  68.3  161.2  110.2 
               
Hungary  72.5  36.1  36.4  66.4  50.3  113.0  56.8 
Poland  103.6  32.5  71.1  34.3  68.6  105.7  72.5 
Slovakia  33.9  7.8  26.1  71.5  77.0  151.8  116.9 
Slovenia  14.9  12.1  2.8  43.4  18.8  70.4  13.3 
               
Estonia  17.5  11.7  5.8  127.5  33.2  197.0  65.3 
Lithuania  11.9  9.5  2.4  46.5  20.2  115.6  23.3 
Latvia  10.8  5.8  5.0  68.1  46.2  98.2  45.3 
               
Bulgaria  9.4  3.5  6.0  35.4  63.4  85.7  54.3 
Romania  25.8  11.8  14.0  26.6  54.4  146.9  80.0 
Croatia  38.0  16.7  21.3  98.7  55.9  140.6  78.7 
Source: BIS Consolidated International Banking Statistics, ultimate risk basis 
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foreign ownership of banks increased considerably in CEE countries, reaching values 
around 80 %–90 % with the exception of Slovenia and to some degree Latvia.
4  
Table 4 also illustrates that the increase in foreign ownership over the last 
five years was indeed due to privatization, as this corresponds to the decrease in 
the share of state-owned banks. 
Both the academic literature and practical experience have shown that foreign 
banks’ involvement in transition countries, especially through entering the local mar-
ket, has brought significant benefits in terms of increased competition in the banking 
sector, better access of corporations and households to external financing, risk ma-
nagement, efficiency, corporate governance, and overall stability of the sector (Clarke 
et al., 2001a); (Haas, Lelyveld, 2002); (Weill, 2003). Banks with international owners 
may supply credit to the economy in a more stable way given the typically high capi-
talization of foreign banks and access to liquidity from the parent office.  
The increase of foreign ownership of banks has also been associated with 
a decrease in the share of non-performing loans in banks’ portfolios (see Table 4). 
However, the causality link is not clear and the apparent co-movement is probably 
a joint product of three factors: first, the crisis that most analyzed countries under-
went in the late 1990s brought an increase in the share of non-performing loans, and 
at the same time might have triggered the decision of policymakers to privatize do-
mestic banks to strong foreign owners. Second, in order to attract foreign capital, 
governments usually cleaned up the balance sheets of the state-owned banks before 
their privatization, moving bad loans out of the banking sector. Finally, better risk 
TABLE 4  Foreign Ownership of Banks 
 





banks (in %) 
Asset share of 
state-owned 
banks (in %) 
Non-performing 
loans (in % 
of total loans)   
1999  2005  1999  2005  1999  2005  1999  2005 
Czech 
Republic  42 (27)  36 (27)  38.4  84.4  41.2  2.5  43.4  4.0 
                 
Hungary  43 (29)  38 (27)  61.5  82.6  7.8  7.0  4.4  3.1 
Poland  77 (39)  61 (50)  49.3  74.2  24.9  21.5  14.9  12.9 
Slovakia  23 (10)  21 (16)  24.1  97.3  50.7  1.1  32.9  5.5 
Slovenia  31 (  5)  25 (  9)  4.9  22.6  42.2  12.0  9.3  6.4 
                 
Estonia  7 (  3)  13 (10)  89.8  99.4  7.9  0.0  2.9  0.2 
Lithuania  13 (  4)  12 (  6)  37.1  91.7  41.9  0.0  11.9  0.7 
Latvia  23 (12)  23 (10)  74.0  57.9  2.6  4.3  6.8  0.7 
                 
Bulgaria  34 (22)  34 (23)  42.8  74.5  50.5  1.7  17.5  3.8 
Romania  34 (19)  33 (24)  43.6  59.2  50.3  6.5  35.4  6.1 
Croatia  53 (13)  34 (13)  40.3  91.2  39.8  3.4  20.6  7.2 
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2006 
4 The lower share of foreign-owned banks in Romania as of 2005 does not yet reflect the early 2006 
privatization of the biggest Romanian bank, Banca Comerciala Romana, to Erste Bank of Austria, which
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management and prudent behavior of foreign-owned banks may have prevented 
accumulation of non-performing loans to which state-owned banks might be more 
prone, especially in an environment of strengthened banking supervision. 
5.  Financial Stability Challenges 
Besides the above-mentioned benefits, there are also several less clear-cut 
financial stability implications of foreign-bank penetration in CEE countries. The re-
patriation of local banks’ profits may put pressure on current account. Foreign-owned 
banks may prefer to provide local loans in foreign currency, especially in the cur-
rency of the  home country if they refinance themselves in the  home market via 
the parent bank. This could increase the vulnerability of borrowers to exchange-rate 
movements and transmit back to banks via increased credit risk. Additional sources 
of risk may stem from the transfer of decision-making and risk management to 
the foreign headquarters and unification of the rules within the whole banking group, 
which does not take into account local concerns and may lead to worse access to fi-
nancing from local small and medium-sized enterprises (Clarke et al., 2001b); (ECB, 
2006). 
However, one of the main financial stability implications of the presence of 
foreign banks and foreign lending is the risk of cross-border contagion. Using the BIS 
data on international bank lending, we discuss in greater detail three aspects of cross- 
-border contagion: maturity of cross-border exposures, concentration of foreign credi-
tors and the existence of a common creditor. 
The risk of cross-border contagion increases particularly if the cross-border 
exposures of global agents have very short maturity and investors can thus liquidate 
them virtually instantly. Table 5 shows the  maturity breakdown of international 
claims on CEE countries. The Czech Republic, together with Romania, Slovakia and 
Croatia, has a relatively large share of short-term international claims from foreign 
TABLE 5 International Claims by Maturity 
(in % of all international claims; end-2005) 
 
Up to 
and incl. 1Y 
Over 1Y 
and up to 2Y  Over 2Y  Unallocated by 
maturity 
Czech Republic  37.7  3.8  41.6  16.9 
         
Hungary  27.1  4.4  48.6  19.9 
Poland  25.5  3.9  52.8  17.9 
Slovakia  41.4  4.2  33.7  20.7 
Slovenia  33.7  4.8  54.2  7.3 
         
Estonia  29.5  7.6  44.2  18.7 
Lithuania  30.0  15.1  44.2  10.7 
Latvia  36.1  11.6  45.9  6.4 
         
Bulgaria  36.8  6.3  49.0  7.9 
Romania  47.4  5.1  41.2  6.4 
Croatia  38.5  7.1  46.9  7.5 
Source: BIS Consolidated International Banking Statistics, immediate borrower basis. 36                                      Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2) 
banks, when compared to other CEE countries. Nevertheless, the share of long-term 
claims is higher. With regard to the claims unallocated by maturity, i.e. mainly hol-
dings of equities, the Czech Republic stands somewhere in the middle among CEE 
countries. To the extent that holdings of shares represent portfolio investments rather 
than strategic or foreign direct investments, the risk of sudden outflow of capital 
might be higher. 
The second factor affecting the risk of cross-border contagion is concen-
tration of foreign claims. For example, if foreign claims are concentrated with one 
large creditor and that creditor is hit by a shock which forces it to liquidate its foreign 
investments, the impact on the debtor country will certainly be greater than if the do-
mestic economy uses foreign capital from several countries. Table 6 shows foreign 
claims by country of origin. Interestingly, the main creditors differ across different 
groups of countries. In the CEE-5 countries, Austria and Germany are the most im-
portant claim holders, while in the Baltic countries the most important are Sweden 
and Finland. In the  AC-3 countries, besides Austria, Greece is also worth men-
tioning.
5   
The table shows that foreign claims are relatively concentrated in the case of 
the Czech Republic (the three most important creditor countries hold around 73 % of 
all foreign reported claims) compared to other CEE countries. However, the by far 
most concentrated foreign claims can be found in the Baltic countries. In Estonia, for 
example, foreign claims coming from Sweden account for almost 80 % of all foreign 
claims, suggesting that the sensitivity of the Estonian financial sector to economic 
conditions in Sweden might be relatively high. 
TABLE 6  Foreign Bank Claims by Geographic Origin 
  (end-2005; claims by banks from selected countries in % of total foreign claims) 
  AT  BE  DE  FI  FR  GR  JP  NL  SE  US  Top-3 
Czech 
Republic  28.4  26.2  6.7  0.0  18.6  0.0  0.5  3.4  0.0  2.7  73.2 
                       
Hungary  23.9  12.8  25.6  0.0  4.1  0.0  1.4  4.7  0.2  2.6  62.3 
Poland  7.4  6.7  16.7  0.1  2.9  0.0  2.5  10.6  1.9  5.9  34.8 
Slovakia  42.0  9.3  4.9  0.0  2.2  0.0  0.2  8.2  0.1  3.1  59.5 
Slovenia  39.8  7.2  21.3  0.0  8.9  0.1  1.7  1.1  0.1  0.2  70.0 
                       
Estonia  1.5  0.6  5.3  12.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  78.2  0.2  95.5 
Lithuania  2.4  0.4  9.5  14.2  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  56.7  0.4  80.4 
Latvia  2.6  0.2  10.3  10.4  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  58.2  0.1  78.9 
                       
Bulgaria  16.0  0.8  7.3  0.0  4.4  18.7  0.4  2.1  0.0  2.5  42.1 
Romania  19.6  0.2  5.5  0.0  16.4  11.5  0.5  12.0  0.2  3.5  48.1 
Croatia  41.7  0.4  7.3  0.0  1.2  0.3  0.9  0.4  0.0  0.5  50.2 
Source: BIS Consolidated International Banking Statistics, immediate borrower basis 
5 Unfortunately, the BIS data on an immediate borrower basis do not include claims by Italian banks,
which are very active in the region. Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2)                                                37 
The third factor which co-determines the  degree of risk of cross-border 
contagion is the degree of similarity of the creditor structures of individual debtor 
countries. For example, if a debtor country was hit by a large shock and all the cre-
ditors of that country were affected, it is possible that they would also withdraw their 
exposures from other countries where they have their claims (Kaminsky, Reinhart, 
2000); (Peek, Rosengren, 2000); (Sbarcia, Zaghini, 2001). If the creditor structure of 
another country was completely identical to that of the country affected by the pri-
mary shock, this other country would also probably be hit by an investment outflow 
to the same extent. 
To capture the degree of similarity of creditor structure, we calculated com-
mon creditor indices (van Rijckeghem, Weder, 2001); (de Alessi Gracio et al., 2005). 
Index I measures the similarity in patterns of creditors between any two countries and 
is bounded between 0 and 1 (1 indicates the same composition of creditors, while 
0 indicates no common creditor). For computing Index I, the following formula was 
used: 














⎡ ⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
⎢ ⎥ −⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ + ⎢ ⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ =− ⎢ ⎥ + ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎢ ⎥ +⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎢ ⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦
∑  
where  vxc denotes the  common creditor country’s foreign claims on the  CEE 
country x, vyc denotes the common creditor country’s foreign claims on the CEE 
country y, vx denotes total foreign claims on the CEE country x, and vy denotes 
total foreign claims on the CEE country y. Intuitively, Index I is made up of two 
terms. The first term equals the common creditor’s share of total foreign claims 
on the two CEE countries. The second term weights the first term – a higher weight 
reflects greater similarity between the shares of total foreign claims held by the com-
mon creditor. Summing is done across the 10 common creditor countries given in 
Table 6. 
Table 7 indicates that some CEE countries indeed share to some extent 
common creditors with each other. The Czech Republic's creditor structure is broadly 
similar to that of Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania, but less similar to that 
of Poland and other CEE countries. This reflects the results of the expansion strategy 
of several (mainly EU-based) banking groups which acquired significant shares in 
domestic banking sectors in a number of central and eastern European countries. In-
terestingly, two main groups of countries linked with common creditors are emer-
ging: CEE-5 and AC-3 countries on the one hand, and Baltic countries on the other 
hand. As discussed above, this is due to the significant role of foreign banks from 
Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Belgium in the CEE-5 and AC-3 countries, as 
compared to the role of Scandinavian banks in Baltic countries.   
However, the picture may be distorted by the inclusion of the claims of sub-
sidiaries of reporting banks, including loans with longer maturities, which probably could 38                                      Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2) 
not be instantly liquidated in the event of cross-border contagion. Moreover, for the com-
mon creditor effect to materialize and to present a risk to financial stability would require 
two additional conditions to be fulfilled: first, the common creditor bank would have to 
be rather weak, and second, the adverse shock would have to be rather large. These con-
ditions are rather hard to fulfill. Foreign banks active in the CEE countries are usually 
some of the largest banks from advanced EU countries and the relevance of CEE claims 
in their portfolios is rather limited.
6 The vulnerability of the financial sector in many 
CEE countries is also limited by sufficiently sound macroeconomic policies. Thus, so far 
the risk of cross-border contagion seems to be contained. 
6.  Conclusions 
In this article, the role of foreign banks and foreign lending in the Czech 
Republic and other CEE countries was analyzed from the financial stability perspec-
tive. Increased integration of CEE countries into international financial markets, both 
via borrowing abroad and entry of foreign banks into local markets, might increase 
the risk of cross-border contagion.  
Using the  BIS data on the  international banking business, we analyzed 
the pattern of foreign banks’ involvement and concentrated on three aspects related 
to the risk of cross-border contagion: maturity of cross-border exposures, concentra-
tion of foreign creditors and the existence of a common creditor. The analysis sug-
gests that the integration of CEE countries into international financial markets and 
the high share of foreign ownership and capital flows into these countries may create 
channels for the transmission of foreign shocks and foster greater susceptibility to 
the risk of cross-border contagion. The analysis concentrated on “fundamental-based” 
contagion, i.e. contagion that is caused by the existence of cross-border financial 
linkages, but in principle the high degree of openness of financial sectors in the CEE 
countries may create preconditions for any kind of contagion. 
Nevertheless, any contagion through the cross-border claims channel would 
have to be generated by a large shock in the source country with a major impact on 
TABLE 7  Common Creditor Indices 
(end-2005; using country structure of foreign claims on an immediate borrower 
basis) 
CZ  1.00                     
HU  0.67  1.00                   
PL  0.44  0.67  1.00                 
SK  0.62  0.70  0.64  1.00               
SI  0.64  0.78  0.56  0.76  1.00             
EE  0.12  0.14  0.15  0.10  0.10  1.00           
LT  0.24  0.36  0.39  0.27  0.29  0.79  1.00         
LV  0.23  0.38  0.40  0.28  0.32  0.79  0.95  1.00       
BG  0.48  0.60  0.62  0.62  0.51  0.09  0.26  0.28  1.00     
RO  0.61  0.61  0.56  0.62  0.54  0.10  0.26  0.28  0.71  1.00   
HR  0.47  0.56  0.55  0.80  0.71  0.11  0.31  0.33  0.67  0.53  1.00 
  CZ  HU  PL  SK  SI  EE  LT  LV  BG  RO  HR 
Source: BIS Consolidated International Banking Statistics, immediate borrower basis 
6 However, there is some opposite evidence for Austrian banks where claims on CEE countries represent
a relatively large share of both total assets and income (Breyer, 2004). Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2)                                                39 
creditor countries. Given the heavy involvement of advanced economies as creditors 
of CEE countries and the relatively small share of claims on CEE countries in the cre-
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